7/24/2010
Il fallimento di Obama in Birmania - Articolo di Paulo Sergio Pinheiro
Pubblichiamo un articolo apparso sul Washington Post a firma di Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Rappresentante Speciale per i Diritti Umani in Birmania dal 2000 al 2008 e ora Professore di Studi Internazionali alla Brown Univesity.
L'articolo
esprime una serie di lucide critiche alla strategia
dell'amministrazione Obama nei confronti della giunta militare birmana
e suggerisce la necessità di cambiare con immediatezza l'approccio
complessivo nei confronti della giunta, che sino ad oggi non ha
prodotto alcun risultato. Pinheiro chiede agli USA di mettere tra le
priorità della strategia internazionale la vicenda birmana facendo sì
che una rafforzata pressione multilaterale possa costringere la giunta
a sedersi al tavolo negoziale. Propone inoltre la nomina di un inviato
speciale USA e un lavoro nei confronti degli alleati a partire dal
Forum regionale dell'ASEAN per "assicurare che la maggior parte dei
paesi rigettino i risultati delle prossime elezioni" che non saranno nè
libere nè eque. Chiede il pieno sostegno della richiesta
avanzata dal suo successore, Tomás Ojea Quintana, per la costituzione
di una Commissione di Inchiesta ONU sui crimini contro l'umanità e sui
crimini di guerra commessi dalla giunta, per un embargo globale sulle
armi e un rafforzato controllo per la piena attuazione delle sanzioni
USA, mirando sopratutto alle banche di Dubai e Singapore che fanno
affari con il regime, ed infine chiede che gli USA approfittino del
ruolo che ricopriranno il prossimo anno nell'analisi delle violazioni
dei diritti umani - nel quadro del processo di revisione periodica al
Consiglio per i Diritti Umani - sulla Birmania.
Puoi leggere l'articolo del Washington Post più in basso o seguendo questo link:
Obama's Failure in Burma
By Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro
- Friday, July 23, 2010
With
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attending the ASEAN Regional Forum
this week, it is an opportune moment to examine U.S. efforts to engage
with Burma (also known as Myanmar). When President Obama was
inaugurated, many in the international community were particularly
enthusiastic about a return to U.S. multilateralism to address global
problems. Nowhere was this more necessary than in the case of Burma,
where a brutal military dictatorship has for decades both oppressed its
people and failed to yield power, despite losing democratic elections
in a landslide in 1990.
Many
observers of the nascent administration, myself included, applauded
Clinton's announcement in early 2009 of a full review of U.S. policy towards Burma. I understood that some creative thinking would be
valuable, having spent eight years as the U.N. special rapporteur on
human rights in Myanmar, trying to address the problems created by the
junta. Yet since those early days, the Obama administration has made a
series of inexplicable missteps.
First,
the administration took some eight months to develop its new policy. As
the junta increased its repression in the run-up to elections it
scheduled for this year, the United States was absent in the global
debate on how to respond. Not only did Washington fail to communicate
its intentions, but this silence left many diplomats confused. This
disengagement resulted in reduced pressure on the Burmese junta as
other countries awaited the results of the U.S. review. When a new policy was announced last fall, it was remarkably uninspiring and
uninspired: keep sanctions and increase engagement. Why it took eight
months to develop such an obvious result is unclear.
Second,
the administration has left unfilled the congressionally mandated
position of special coordinator on Burma policy. While Assistant
Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has all the qualities necessary to
lead the State Department's engagement with the junta, he is also
responsible for all U.S. policy relating to Asia, so he has limited
time to focus on Burma, and the lack of sustained focus has been
lamentable.
Finally,
when the United States got around to engaging directly with the junta,
it took a surprisingly unilateral approach. I do not understand why the
administration would think it would have any leverage with this regime
without bringing partners to the dialogue. The Burmese junta knows it
has support from China and Russia in the U.N. Security Council. It is
making billions of dollars annually from its natural resources. And the
United States will get no leverage from existing sanctions against
Burma until it exercises its leadership to bring into the process
others whose views do matter to the regime.
If
the United States wants to influence the junta, it must immediately
change its entire approach. Beyond appointing an envoy, it must make
Burma policy a high-level priority. The junta has the upper hand.
Without the kind of pressure the United States can bring to bear
multilaterally, the junta will have no incentive to come to the table,
let alone change its behavior.
Specifically,
the United States should reach out to its allies, beginning at the
ASEAN Regional Forum, to ensure that most nations will reject the
results from Burma's upcoming "elections," which by every indication
will be neither free nor fair. It should publicly embrace the call of
my successor, Tomás Ojea Quintana, to create a commission of inquiry
through the United Nations to investigate crimes against humanity and
war crimes committed by the junta, and then work multilaterally to make
this inquiry happen. It should fully enforce existing U.S. sanctions
and target Singaporean and Dubai banks that do business with the
regime. It should work to impose a global arms embargo on Burma. And it
should take full advantage of being one of three countries to lead the
cross-examination of Burma's human rights
record in the Universal Periodic Review process taking place in the
U.N. Human Rights Council early next year.
Some
will say it is unrealistic to expect the United States to put in this
kind of concerted diplomatic effort, particularly given its other
foreign policy priorities. I have dealt with the Burmese junta and
understand better than most how hard it is to influence the generals. I
am certain that if the United States actually wants to affect this
regime, its efforts must be strategic, focused and unrelenting.
Given
the forthcoming "elections" in Burma, President Obama and Secretary
Clinton have limited time to turn around their policy. As a start, they
need to take Burma and this situation seriously. Then they need to show
the world that the United States means what it says.
(24 Luglio 2010)